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In many developed countries, children's diet has deteriorated tremendously over the last decades; 
resulting in significant increases in child obesity, but also in important deficiencies in those 
nutrients playing an essential role in cognitive development. In 2004, the Celebrity Chef Jamie 
Oliver embarked on a large campaign aiming at improving school meals in the UK. This paper uses 
the unique features of the “Jamie Oliver Feed Me Better” campaign to study the effects of healthy 
school meals on educational achievements of children in primary school. The Jamie Oliver 
campaign introduced drastic changes in the meals offered in the schools of one borough 
(Greenwich), shifting from low-budget processed meals, high in saturated fat, salt, and sugar 
towards healthier options. 
 
Since school meals were changed in one Local Education Area only at first, we can use a difference 
in differences approach to identify the causal effect of healthy meals on educational performance. 
More precisely, using pupil and school-level data from the National Pupil Database (NPD) and 
from the School census, we can compare Key stage 2 test scores results before and after the 
campaign, using neighbouring local education areas as a control group.  
 
We identify positive effects of the “Feed me Better” campaign on Key Stage 2 test scores in English 
and Sciences. The effects are quite substantial: Our estimates show that the campaign increased the 
percentage of pupils reaching level 4 by 3 to 6 percentage points in English, and the percentage of 
pupils reaching level 5 by 3 to 8 percentage points in Science. Moreover, we find that a substantial 
decrease in absenteeism in Greenwich schools after the campaign, in particular in “authorised 
absences”, which are more likely to be due to sickness (and therefore health). The rate of 
absenteeism falls by about .80 percentage points, which is about 15% of the average absenteeism 
rate in our sample, thus a notable effect. 
 
These effects are particularly noteworthy because they measure direct and immediate effects of 
improvement in children’s diet on educational achievements only. There could be additional 
benefits (in particular in terms of health), beyond the improvements in educational achievements, 
which we are unable to measure because of lack of data. Nevertheless, even if we only take these 
short-term benefits into account, we find that the campaign was very cost-effective, with costs and 
benefits similar to other policies (such as the “literacy hour”) implemented in the UK in the 
nineties. 
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This paper uses the “Jamie Oliver Feed Me Better” campaign to evaluate the 
impact of healthy school meals on educational outcomes. The campaign 
introduced drastic changes in the meals offered in the schools of one 
Borough, shifting from low-budget processed meals towards healthier 
options. We evaluate the effect of the campaign on educational outcomes 
using a difference in differences approach; comparing key stage 2 outcomes 
in primary schools before and after the reform, using the neighbouring 
Local Education Authorities as a control group. We find evidence that 
healthy school meals did improve educational outcomes, in particular in 
English and Science.  
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“Mens Sana in Corpore Sano” 
(A Sound Mind in a Sound Body) 





Economists have recently pointed at the importance of early interventions to affect 
later educational outcomes and reduce disparities in society (e.g. Heckman (2006)). 
One crucial determinant of child development is nutrition and diet.  In many 
developed countries, children's diet has deteriorated tremendously over the last 
decades, with direct consequences on child obesity rates and child health. In 2006, 
15% of children aged 2 to 10 in the UK were classified as “obese”, compared to 10% 
only 10 years ago1. According to the World Health Organization (2002), nutrition is 
related to five of the ten leading risks as causes of disease burden measured in DALYs 
(Disability Adjusted Life Years) in developed countries i.e. blood pressure, 
cholesterol, overweight (obesity), low fruit and vegetable intake, and iron deficiency. 
Importantly, poor diet does not only have direct negative effects on child weight and 
child health, but also results in significant deficiencies in those nutrients playing an 
essential role in cognitive development (see Lambert et al. (2004)). Indeed, the 
evidence shows a significant and immediate effect of diet on behaviour, concentration 
and cognitive ability (see Sorhaindo and Feinstein (2006) for a review). For example, 
deficiencies in zinc, iodine, iron and folate have been found to significantly impair the 
cognitive development of school-aged children (Delange, 2000; Bryan et al. (2004), 
Pollitt and Gorman (1994)).    
  
Very little is known on the effect of poor diet on academic achievements in developed 
countries. There are a number of studies documenting correlations between 
malnutrition and educational outcomes (see Pollitt (1990), Behrman (1996), 
Alderman et al. (2006)), but most of this literature concentrates on developing 
                                                 
1
  Source: Health Survey for England, Obesity is defined by a body mass index (weight in kg / 
(height in m)2) higher than 30.)  
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countries (and therefore on malnourishment rather than poor eating habits), and few of 
them are able to establish a causal effect, i.e. they do not have a source of exogenous 
variation in nutritional habits. This paper uses the unique features of the “Jamie Oliver 
Feed Me Better” campaign, lead in the UK in 2004 by the celebrity chef Jamie Oliver. 
The campaign introduced drastic changes in the meals offered in the schools of one 
Borough – Greenwich, shifting from low-budget processed meals, high in saturated 
fat, salt, and sugar towards healthier options. Using pupil and school-level data from 
the National Pupil Database (NPD) and from the School census, we evaluate the 
effect of the campaign on educational outcomes in primary schools using a difference 
in differences approach; comparing educational outcomes (key stage 2 outcomes more 
specifically) before and after the reform, using the neighbouring Local Education 
Authorities as a control group. 
 
School meals are important because they are one of the most obvious instruments for 
policy intervention in children’s diet. In the UK, all public schools offer school meals 
(about 45% of school kids in primary and secondary schools eat school lunches every 
day). In addition, school meals are part of a means-tested program, such that children 
from less privileged backgrounds receive school meals for free. In 2006, around 18% 
of the pupil population was eligible for the free school meal program.2 Hence, school 
meals provide a direct way for policy-makers to possibly reduce disparities in diet 
between children from more and less privileged socio-economic backgrounds, which 
in turn could contribute to reduce differences in educational outcomes. Furthermore, 
school meals are now more important than in the past, since children seem to rely 
more on food provided at school now than three decades ago. For example, Anderson, 
Butcher and Levine (2003) show that increases in maternal employment rates in the 
US have been associated with an increase in obesity rates, which they attribute partly 
to the decrease in the consumption of “home cooked meals”. Finally, because children 
are not “economic agents” as such – they are usually not the ones taking the decisions 
on the food they purchase - the possible relevance of policy intervention is greater 
than for adults.  
 
                                                 
2
 See appendix for details of eligibility criteria 
 3 
We find that the campaign had a positive and significant effect on educational 
achievements. Our estimates show that the campaign increased the percentage of 
pupils reaching level 4 by 3 to 6 percentage points in English, and the percentage of 
pupils reaching level 5 by 3 to 8 percentage points in Science. We also find that 
authorised absences (which are likely to be linked to sickness) drop by 15% on 
average. These effects are particularly noteworthy since they only capture direct and 
immediate effects of improvement in children’s diet on educational achievements. 
One could have expected that changing diet habits is a long and difficult process, 
which would possibly only have effects after a long time, effects that would be hard to 
measure. The fact that we do find short-term effects directly on educational 
achievements shows that improving school meals can make an immediate difference 
to educational achievements.  
 
The campaign also provides an interesting and unique opportunity to shed some light 
on a possible placebo effect, which is usually hard to assess in social sciences. We 
investigate how test scores changed in the schools that were mentioned explicitly in 
the television program, with the hypothesis that maybe these schools were more 
vulnerable to a possible placebo effect than other schools. We actually find a negative 
effect for those schools. That is, rather than a positive placebo effect, it seems that 
these schools rather experienced some disruption.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the background of the “Feed 
me Better Campaign”. Section 2 discusses the existing evidence in the literature on 
the effects of nutrition on health and educational outcomes. Section 3 describes the 
sample and data we use in our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents our identification 
strategy and the results. Section 5 concludes.   
 
 
1. Background: School Meals and the Jamie Oliver Campaign 
 
The celebrity chef Jamie Oliver started the campaign “Feed me Better” in 2004, 
drawing the attention of the media to the poor quality of meals offered in schools. His 
campaign was documented in a TV programme which was broadcast in prime time in 
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February 2005 on one of the major UK channels (Channel 4). The program featured 
mainly one school in Greenwich (Kidbrooke secondary school), which then served as 
pilot for the Jamie Oliver “experiment”. The idea was to drastically change the school 
meal menus in schools, starting with this pilot school in the borough of Greenwich, 
and then extending the changes to all schools in the borough. Figure 1 shows an 
example of a weekly menu introduced by Oliver. 
 
The campaign was successful in its implementation since the Council of Greenwich, 
in charge of setting the menus for all schools of the county, agreed to adopt the new 
“Jamie Oliver” menus and most schools switched from their old menus to the new 
menus in the school year 2004-2005. The campaign mobilised a lot of resources, 
involved retraining the cooks (most cooks participated to a three-day boot camp 
organised by the Chef) and equipping the schools with the appropriate equipment.  
 
In the initial stages, in the pilot school of Kidbrooke, the healthy meals were being put 
along side the original junk food. In most cases children preferred to stick to the junk 
food rather than opting for the healthy meals. This was not the case when the scheme 
was rolled out across the borough. In September 2004 at the start of the autumn term 
Jamie hosted an evening for all the head teachers in which they were invited to take 
part in the experiment. In the TV programme we are not told how many schools sign 
up, they are all offered the opportunity but some do not choose to participate. The aim 
was then to roll the scheme, which completely replaced the junk food with healthy 
alternatives, out in 6 weeks, so it commenced just after the half term-October 2004. 
The scheme was rolled out gradually across the borough, five schools at a time. By 
February 2005 more than 25 schools had removed all processed foods and 
implemented the new menus. The roll out had taken place fully by September 2005 
with 81 of the 88 schools taking part in the scheme. 
 
As part of the experiment the council has increased the investment into school meals: 
an initial increase in the school  food budget  by £628,850 was agreed in the February 
2005 budget going to cover the cost of the extra staff hours that were needed in 
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preparation of the meal, equipment costs and promotion to the parents. By September 
2007 a total £1.2 million had been invested  in school meals3. 
 
The dinner ladies were trained over the half-term break in a so-called boot camp. The  
scheme was temporarily halted in December 2004 for budgetary concerns, although 
this was eventually resolved, the schools had to find the money themselves if they 
went over budget. Greenwich council also agreed to put more funding into school 
meals. After the filming of Jamie's School dinners the School Food Trust was 
established in September 2005 with the remit of improving school dinners across the 
board. Greenwich had the advantage of being one of the first areas to improve their 
meals and the standards introduced by the Schools Food Trust would have taken time 
to take effect. 
 
Despite the initial difficulties of implementation, the evaluation of the campaign has 
been quite positive. The website of the “Heath Education Trust” for example mentions 
the following reactions: The Head teacher of Kidbrooke School said, “Because the 
children aren’t being stuffed with additives they’re much less hyper in the afternoons 
now. It hasn’t been an easy transition as getting older children to embrace change 
takes time.”; One classroom teacher commented, “Children enjoy the food and talk 
about it more than they did in the past. They seem to have more energy and can 
concentrate for longer.” 
  
Nutritional analysis  
We do have some information on the nutritional content of the meals offered to the 
children before the changes, although only through the TV programme. The Jamie 
Oliver team hired nutritionists to analyse the meals and found that the meals 
contained no vitamin C at all and contained between 1/3 to a ½ of iron of what is 
typically recommended in a meal. There is a large body of evidence in the medical 
literature showing the importance of vitamin C for immunity, from the common cold 
(Sasazuki et al (2006), Hemila (1992)) to lung function, Schwartz and Weiss(1992)) 
and on the absorption of iron (Cook et al (1982)). Iron, on the other hand, has been 
                                                 
3
 Source: www.greenwich.gov.uk 
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found to influence cognition and concentration. We discuss in more detail the findings 
of the medical literature in the next section.  
 
2. Related literature 
 
Despite the importance of the subject in the public and policy arenas, there is only a 
limited number of studies on the causal effect of children’s diet on health on the one 
hand, and educational outcomes on the other.  
 
The medical literature has carried out a number of studies on the relationship between 
diet and behaviour, concentration and educational outcomes. Sorhaindo and Feinstein 
(2006) provide a literature review of this literature. They mention four different 
channels through which nutrition may affect educational outcomes. The first channel 
is through physical development. A poor diet leaves children susceptible to illness 
through a poor immune system. Greater illness results in more days absent and further 
a decrease in teacher contact hours which may result in a decrease in performance. 
The second channel is through cognition and ability to concentrate. Numerous studies 
have found that there is a link between diet on the ability of children to think and 
concentrate. In particular deficiencies in iron can have an impact on the development 
of the central nervous system and also cognition in later life.  Sorhaindo and Feinstein 
(2006) point out two crucial findings in the existing studies. Firstly, good nutrition in 
early childhood is important in the cognitive development for both school-aged and 
adolescent children. Secondly, children's academic performance is altered by diet on 
an instant basis. The third channel mentioned in their review is behaviour. There is a 
causal link between a deficiency in vitamin B and behavioural problems; particularly 
this is related to aggressive behaviour and changes in personality. The research in this 
area is more limited. There could also be social interaction effects through peer effects 
within the classroom if it is the case that healthy food has an impact on behaviour. 
Healthy school meals could generate  positive externalities on all children, through 
their positive effect on behaviour in the classroom. Finally, the last channel mentioned 
is though school life and in particular difficult school inclusion due to obesity. 
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Economists have recently devoted more attention to the determinants and effects of 
obesity, and child obesity in particular. Anderson and Butcher (2006) review the 
literature investigating the possible reasons underlying the rise in child obesity. They 
conclude that there does not seem to be one single determining factor of the rise, 
rather a combination of factors. Interestingly, they do point at the important changes 
in the school environment, such as the availability of vending machines in schools, as 
a possible factor triggering calories intake and thereby obesity. One study they have 
carried out (Anderson and Butcher (2005)) link school financial pressures to 
availability of junk food in middle and high schools, and estimate that a 10 percentage 
point increase in the availability of junk food produces an average increase in BMI of 
1 percent, while for adolescents with an overweight parent the effect is double. Effects 
of this size can explain about a quarter of the increase in average BMI of adolescents 
over the 1990’s.  Whitmore (2005) evaluates the effects of eating school lunches 
(from the US based National School Lunch Program) on childhood obesity. She uses 
two sources of variations to identify the effect of eating school lunches on children’s 
obesity. First, she exploits within-individual time variation in individual school lunch 
participation, and second, she exploits the discontinuity in eligibility for reduced-price 
lunch – available to children from families earning less than 185 percent of the 
poverty rate – to compare children just above and just below the eligibility cut-off. 
She finds that students who eat school lunch are more likely to be obese. She 
attributes this effect to the poor nutritional content of lunches and concludes that 
healthier school meals could reduce child obesity.  
 
There is a limited number of studies studying the effect of diet on educational 
performance, based on interventions in the US. Kleinman et al. (2002) and Murphy et 
al. (1998) study the effects of an intervention providing free school breakfasts and 
found evidence of a positive effect on school performance. However, the evidence is 
limited to small-scale interventions.  
 
A recent study by Figlio and Winicki (2005) find that schools tend to change the 
nutritional content of their lunches on test days. They present this as evidence of 
strategic behaviour of schools, which seem to exploit the relationship between food 
and performance as a way of “gaming” the accountability system. Using disaggregate 
 8 
data from schools in the state of Virginia, they find that those schools who are most at 
risk of receiving a sanction for not meeting proficiency goals, increase the number of 
calories of school lunches on test days. This strategy seems to be somewhat effective, 
with significant improvements in test scores in mathematics and to a lesser extent in 
History/Social Sciences. However, they argue that these changes are targeted at 
immediate and short-lived improvements in performance, based on an increase of the 
number of calories and glucose intake, rather than a long-term strategy aimed at 
providing a healthier and balanced diet to children.  
 
 
3. Data, sample and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data and Sample 
We investigate the effect of the campaign on three outcome variables: Educational 
outcomes, take-up rates and sickness absenteeism.  
 
For educational outcomes, we chose to concentrate on performance in primary 
schools for two main reasons: 1) The recent economic literature has pointed to the 
importance of interventions in early childhood, 2) primary school children are less 
likely to have been able to substitute for school meals by alternative food (such as 
buying junk food in neighbouring outlets). We use detailed individual data from the 
National Pupil Database (NPD), which matches information collected through the 
Pupil Level Annual Schools Census (PLASC) to other data sources such as Key Stage 
attainment.  
 
The NPD contains information on key pupil characteristics. These include several 
variables such as ethnicity, a low-income marker and information on Special 
Education Needs (SEN), that we have matched with Keystage 2 attainment records. 
Key Stage 2 corresponds to the years 3-7 in England; and all pupils take a 
standardized test at the end of the Key Stage (in year 7, typically at the age of 11). 
The Key Stage 2 test has three main components: English, Maths and Sciences. We 
will consider these three components separately. In addition, we use data at the school 
level from the School Census provided by the Department for Children, School and 
Families (DCFS).  
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Second, we investigate the effect of the campaign on take-up rates of school meals, 
for children who are eligible for free school meals (provided by the DCSF). There is 
no public information available on the take-up rate for all children, so this measure is 
the closest indicator we have to assess the effect of the campaign on take-up.  
 
We concentrate the analysis on the school years from 2002 to 2007, and exclude the 
year 2005 to avoid misclassification problems (since menus were effectively changed 
in the course of the school year 2004-2005) 
 
We use seven neighbouring Local Education Countries as controls for the analysis. 
These LEAs were chosen because of their resemblance to Greenwich, on a number of 
aggregate statistics on socio-economic characteristics, such as the proportion of 
whites, proportion of households living in social housing and the unemployment rate. 
Figure 2 shows the geographical location of these LEAs and Table 1 presents 
summary neighbourhood statistics of these LEAs.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 compares control and treatment schools on a number of observable 
characteristics, as well as educational outcomes, before and after the campaign. 
Although we have chosen the control LEAs for their similarities with Greenwich, 
there are a number of notable differences worth pointing out. The percentage of non 
white pupils is substantially higher in Greenwich than in the control areas. The 
reverse is true for the percentage of pupils speaking English as their first language. On 
the other hand, indicators of social deprivation, such as the Income Deprivation 
Affecting Children Index and the percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals 
are comparable in the treatment and control groups. Importantly for our analysis, 
these indicators are quite similar before and after the campaign.  
 
Turning to educational outcomes, we find that most indicators do increase between 
2004 and 2006, both in the treatment schools and in Greenwich. There is a slight 
relative improvement in performance in Greenwich in comparison to other LEAs.  
 
 10 
We now turn to a more detailed empirical analysis.  
 
4.  Analysis  
4.1 Empirical strategy 
 We follow closely Machin and McNally (2008) in the structure of the empirical 
analysis. We consider two different specifications, a first specification based on a 
difference-in-differences approach and a second specification using propensity 
matching techniques.  
 
For the difference-in-differences approach, we estimate the following model: 
 
Yislt = α + β Greenwichl + γ Greenwichl* Post-2005t + δXist + λZst + πt Tt + ρlt + εist 
 
Where Yist denotes the outcome variable for pupil i in school s in LEA l in year  t; 
Greenwich is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the LEA of Greenwich and 0 for the 
seven neighbouring LEAs; Post-2005 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for school years 
2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 and 0 for school years 2002-03, 2003-04; X is a vector 
of pupil characteristics, Z is a vector of school characteristics; T is a set of yearly 
dummies; and εist is an error term. In addition to the Machin and McNally (2008) 
specification, we also allow for LEA specific trends (captured by the parameters ρl).  
γ is our main coefficient of interest. It shows how pupil performance changed in 
Greenwich schools in comparison to other LEAs. If the campaign had a positive effect 
on diet and performance, we should find a positive coefficient. 
 
As in Machin and McNally (2008), we also estimate an equation including school 
fixed effects. The effect of Greenwich is captured by these school fixed effects, but 
we still can estimate the effect of the campaign (γ) 
 
For the matched difference-in-difference approach we follow the basic method of 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), where we estimate the propensity scores and 
then trim the sample based on the common support to exclude poorly matched 
schools. We use a sample of selected matched schools using propensity score 
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matching techniques on the 2003/2004, pre-policy data,. The propensity score 




a) Effect on educational outcomes 
We first study the effect of the campaign on school-level outcomes, more precisely, 
on the percentage of pupils reaching (1) level 3 or more, (2) level 4 or more or (3) 
level 5 in english, maths and science respectively.  
 
We present two sets of results. First, we present results based on school-level data, 
that is, where we aggregated test scores at the school level, and introduce controls for 
school characteristics and school fixed effects. Second, we present results using 
individual pupil data, controlling for individual pupil characteristics and school 
characteristics.  
 
The results for the different specifications are presented in Tables 4-7.  
 
We find that Key stage 2 results are significantly improved, specifically in English 
and Science. We find a significant effect of the interaction dummy on the percentage 
of pupils reaching level 4 in English and on the percentage of people reaching level 5 
in Science. The effects are quite substantial: In English, our estimates vary between 3 
and 6 percentage points; and for science, our estimates vary between 3 and 8 
percentage points.    
 
Free school meal status 
So far we have included all pupils in the analysis. However, only part of them has 
been truly treated, those who actually eat school meals. We do not have individual 
information about who is eating school meals and who is not. The only information 
we have is whether the pupil is eligible for free school meals. One could argue that 
“free school meals” pupils are more likely to have been treated than the other pupils. 
However, we cannot be sure that the change in diet has been most significant for these 
pupils in comparison to others. Thus, we should be careful with the interpretation of 
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the results. Table 7 reports regression results based on the sample of free school meal 
children only. We find that most of the positive significant effects decrease or 
disappear entirely. Thus, we fail to find evidence that the campaign specifically 
helped those children who benefit from free school meals. This result may seem 
counter-intuitive, as the FSM pupils should presumably be the most likely pupils in 
the school to be eating the meals. One possible story is that FSM pupils are those for 
which the change has been to most difficult to implement, since these pupils were 
probably eating the “unhealthy” meals on a daily basis and would therefore maybe be 
the most put off by the change in menus. Anecdotal evidence (from the TV 
programme) suggests that some children refused to eat the healthy meals, which 
would probably have harmed cognitive performance more than eating anything albeit 
something of little nutritional value.  
  
Placebo effect 
One concern is that the campaign affected educational outcomes not through the 
improvement in diet, but simply through a “placebo-effect”. Indeed, the schools were 
very well aware they were part of a “pilot experiment”. It could be that the effect we 
measure is a placebo effect rather than an actual effect of the reform.  
 
We should note that any reform of this kind, that is, where one group of people is 
treated and another is not, is potentially subject to this placebo effect. In contrast to 
experiments in pure sciences, it is virtually impossible to think of a way of 
administering a placebo treatment to a control group. Any change in policy could 
affect outcomes simply because those who are treated know they are treated. There is 
usually no way researchers can be sure that the effect they estimate is truly due to the 
change in policy rather than a placebo effect.  
 
Our setting, nonetheless, provides us scope to investigate the placebo effect to some 
extent. As the campaign was part of a program broadcast on one of the major channels 
in the UK, we have good reasons to believe that some schools were probably more 
subject to a possible placebo effect than others. Some of the treated schools were 
explicitly mentioned in the program, such that one could expect that for those schools, 
the “placebo-effect” could be stronger than others. We have extended the empirical 
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analysis to allow for this possibility. We added an interaction term for those schools 
that were explicitly mentioned during the program (note that some of them were just 
very briefly mentioned, there was no filming on location).  
 
We present the results in Table 8 for English, Maths and Science respectively. The 
results are quite striking. The evidence points in the direction of a “disruption effect” 
rather than a positive placebo effect. In the case of maths, we find that the interaction 
coefficient is significant and negative, while we find no positive effect of the 
campaign overall. For English and Science, the interaction dummy is in most cases 
negative but is not significant. We conclude that the positive effects we have reported 
earlier are unlikely to be due to a placebo effect.  
 
Additional evidence on this disruption is that there were many initial problems in the  
schools that took on the scheme early on. Further, as the programme was rolled out a 
food week was introduced, hence those later schools would have had this and the 
early schools were treated with just a change in the menus with little additional 
support. Further, there were tasting sessions for the parents that did not occur in the 
earlier schools.  
 
The TV schools were among the earliest to change their menus. These schools also 
changed their menus before the additional funding of approximately £600,000 was 
agreed in the budget, hence they would have had to cover the cost of the changes, for 
example the additional kitchen staff hours needed to prepare the new menus, 
especially in the beginning from their existing budgets which would have resulted in 
less inputs in other areas, i.e. books and other equipment. This could also explain why 
those TV schools seem to perform so badly. 
 
Heterogenous effects 
We also investigated whether the reform affected pupils differently according to 
gender, race and statement of special educational need. The results are presented in 
Table 9. We find no clear evidence of heterogeneous effects. Girls seem to have been 
more affected, but we cannot reject that the effect of the reform was identical across 
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gender. Thus, we cannot conclude that the reform affected some students more than 
others, except according to their free school meal status (cfr. discussion above).  
 
b) Effect on take-up rates 
We now examine the effect of the campaign on the take-up rates of free school meals. 
We do not have information on whether children did indeed eat the food or not (the 
anecdotal information we have points that, indeed, children were far from enthusiastic 
at the beginning but did adjust relatively quickly to the new menus), nor do we have 
information on the overall take-up rates of school lunches. We do have, however, 
detailed information at the school level on the percentage of children taking up free 
school meals (conditional on eligibility).  
 
Changes in take-up rates are important to look at because, obviously, falling take-up 
rates would jeopardise the success of the campaign. On the other hand, it could be that 
improvements in the quality of the food encourage take-up, which is known to be 
relatively low in the UK.4 
 
We report the results in Table 12. We find no evidence of a change in take-up rates.  
Figures 5 and 6 show the evolution of eligibility and take-up rates of free school 
meals in each LEA. There is no obvious difference between Greenwich and the other 
LEAs. Hence, we conclude that the campaign has not affected take-up rates of free 
school meals. Obviously, this does not mean that there has been no change in the 
actual consumption of school meals. As we discussed earlier, the change in menus 
had not been implemented easily and some children were reluctant to accept the new 
menus. If that is the case, that means that the effects we have identified are a lower 





                                                 
4
  A related literature (references…) points at possible stigma effects associated with the take-
up of free school meals. It is for example common practice to give free school meal children special 
tokens or allocate a separate cashier for them.  
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c) Effects on absenteeism 
 
We now turn to the effects of campaign on absenteeism. We have information at the 
school level on the percentage of authorised and unauthorised absences. Authorised 
absences are those that are formally pre-authorised by the school, thus likely to be 
linked with sickness. Table 11 shows the results of the DD analysis, both on 
authorised an unauthorised absences. We find a substantial negative effect on 
authorised absences; the rate of absenteeism drops by about .80 percentage points, 
which corresponds to 15% of the average rate of absenteeism. On the other hand, we 
do not find a significant effect on unauthorised absences.  
 
The fall in absenteeism could in itself drive part of the improvement in educational 
outcomes, although obviously only a small part of the population of pupils has 
presumably been affected by this fall. In Table 12, we compare the results we have 
presented earlier (in column 4 of Tables 4, 5 and 6) with results controlling for 
authorised absenteeism at the school level. We find that the coefficients reported 
earlier remain very similar. Thus, the effects on educational achievements are not 
driven by the change in absenteeism. However, it could be that for those children for 
whom absenteeism does change, the improvement in educational achievements is 
more substantial than for the others. Unfortunately, we are unable to identify those 
children in the pupil-level data.   
  
d) Costs and benefits 
Unfortunately we do not have individual or school-level information about health 
outcomes, so our estimates probably provide only a lower bound on the overall 
benefits of the program. It is likely that children’s health improved as well, which 
could also have long-lasting consequences for the children involved not only through 
improved educational achievements, but also in terms of their life expectancy, quality 
of life, and productive capacity on the labour market. We can only provide an 
estimate of the long-term benefits accrued through better learning and better 
educational achievements. The effects we have identified are comparable in 
magnitude to those estimates by Machin and McNally (2008) for the “Literacy Hour”. 
The “Literacy Hour” was a reform implemented in the nineties in the UK to raise 
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standards of literacy in schools by improving the quality of teaching through more 
focused literacy instruction and effective classroom management. They found that the 
reform increased the proportion of pupils reaching level 4 or more in reading 
increased by 3.2 percentage points, an effect very similar to the effect we have 
estimated.  
 
They calculated the overall benefit in terms of future labour market earnings using the 
British Cohort Study, that includes information on wages at age 30 and reading scores 
at age 10. They estimate the overall benefit of the reform to be between £75.40 and 
£196.32 (depending on the specification) per annum, and assuming a discount rate of 3% 
and a labour market participation of 45 years (between 20 and 65) implies an overall 
lifetime benefit between £2103 and £5,476. 
 
It is worthwhile discussing not only the benefits of the programs, but also the costs. 
As we have mentioned earlier, the campaign lead to substantial increases in costs in 
terms of retraining the cooking staff, refurbishing kitchens, and even the food costs 
have increased slightly as well. By September 2007, the council of Greenwich alone 
had invested £1.2 million in the campaign. About 28,000 school children in the 
county benefited from the healthy school meals, thus, the cost per pupil was around 
£43. The largest proportion of these costs was one-off costs (refurbishing kitchens, 
retraining staff), such that in the long-term, the long-term cost per pupil should be 
substantially lower. There is therefore no doubt that the campaign provides large 




This paper exploits the unique features of the “Jamie Oliver Feed Me Better” 
campaign, lead in 2004 by the celebrity chef Jamie Oliver in the UK, to evaluate the 
impact of healthy school meals on educational outcomes.  
 
Since the meals were introduced in one Local Education Area only at first, we can use 
a difference in differences approach to identify the causal effect of healthy meals on 
educational performance.  
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Using pupil and school level data, we evaluate the effect of the reform on educational 
performance in primary schools, more precisely, we compare Key stage 2 test scores 
results before and after the campaign, using neighbouring local education areas as a 
control group.  
 
We identify positive effects of the “Feed me Better Campaign” on Key Stage 2 test 
scores in English and Sciences. The effects are quite substantial: our estimates show 
that the campaign increased the percentage of pupils reaching level 4 by 3 to 6 
percentage points in English, and the percentage of pupils reaching level 5 by 3 to 8 
percentage points in Science. Also, we find that the rate of absenteeism falls by about 
.80 percentage point, which is about 15% of the average rate of absenteeism.  
 
One drawback of our analysis is that we have little information on the health 
outcomes of children, as well as whether children actually ate the meals or not. The 
anecdotal evidence suggests that some children found it hard to adjust to the new 
healthy menus. Our results show that test scores did not improve for children eligible 
for free school meals (and therefore from relatively less privileged socio-economic 
backgrounds), which were probably the ones who were the most used to the previous 
processed food and for whom it was the most difficult to adjust. In this light, the 
positive results we identify could be a lower bound on the long-term effects of a 
change in school meals.  
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Free school meals eligibility criteria: 
 
Parents do not have to pay for school lunches if they receive any of the following: 
Income Support.  
Income-based Jobseeker's Allowance. 
Support under Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.  
Child Tax Credit, provided they are not entitled to Working Tax Credit and have an 
Annual income (as assessed by HM Revenue & Customs) that does not exceed 
£15,575. 
The Guarantee element of State Pension Credit. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
































Figure 4: Free School Meal Eligibility (by LEA) 
































































































1.9% 1.4% 2.0% 1.1% 2.1% 1.9% 2.1% 2.2%  
Social 
housing2 
39.5% 37.1% 41.4% 23.0% 53.4% 35.6% 36.5% 52.5%  
Rate of 
obesity3 




36.4% 25.3% 39.0% 32.4% 37.8% 29.2% 37.9% 55.0%  
Source: Office for National Statistics (Neighbourhood statistics) 1 Obesity rates among adults (obesity is such that body 
mass index > 20), survey from 2003-2005;, 3 People aged 16-74: Economically active: Unemployed (Persons, census 
April 2001), 4 Percentage of households living in housing rented to the Local area council (Census 2001), 4 Percentage of 
pupils eligible for free school meals (School Census 2004) 
 
 
Table 2: Control and treatment schools – Summary statistics  




2004 2006 2004 2006 
Average no. of pupils 341.43 302.6 308.4 278.74 
 
(156.75) (134.51) (115.65) (107.33) 
% of pupils eligible for Free School Meals 39.84 40.44 36.44 35.59 
 
(15.54) (15.58) (16.5) (15.66) 
% of pupils female 48.2 47.95 47.56 47.25 
 
(7.14) (7.72) (9.4) (9.29) 
% of pupils with some special need 25.42 27.92 27.88 30.93 
 
(20.13) (19.81) (20.02) (20.02) 
% of pupils with statement of special need 7.4 7.36 6.16 6.88 
 
(22.48) (22.18) (20.34) (20.45) 
% of pupils non-white 68.74 70.66 40.07 44.08 
 
(18.23) (17.75) (19.48) (20.71) 
& of pupils who have English as a first Language 51.11 49.42 75.21 70.42 
 
(26.56) (26.46) (16.74) (18.31) 
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Average IDACI5 score 45.15 45 39.67 38.94 
 
(10.65) (10.67) (10.49) (9.92) 
% Faith School 26.21 26.21 23.94 23.94 
 
(44.04) (44.04) (42.98) (42.98) 
English: Proportion attaining level 3 and above 87.11 89.43 86.93 89.71 
 
(18.09) (17.58) (18.13) (15.12) 
English: Proportion attaining level 4 and above 70.48 73.88 68.72 73.61 
 
(20.16) (19.85) (19.76) (16.64) 
English: Proportion attaining level 5 and above 21.71 26.16 20.88 26.51 
 
(14.94) (16.41) (15.1) (14.24) 
Maths: Proportion attaining level 3 and above 87.3 89.33 87.39 89.75 
 
(18.16) (17.47) (17.76) (15.17) 
Maths: Proportion attaining level 4 and above 68.53 71.06 68.3 72.13 
 
(19.16) (19.2) (17.83) (17.83) 
Maths: Proportion attaining level 5 and above 26.44 27.59 25.88 29.59 
 
(13.43) (13.76) (13.73) (14.2) 
Science: Proportion attaining level 3 and above 87.83 89.76 88.24 90.64 
 
(18.22) (17.56) (17.7) (14.98) 
Science: Proportion attaining level 4 and above 77.18 78.93 76.54 80 
 
(19.83) (19.89) (19.33) (17.16) 
Science: Proportion attaining level 5 and above 32.99 35.5 31.63 37.86 
 (18.53) (17.98) (17.63) (18.91) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 21.87 20.38 21.43 20.5 
 
(6.05) (5.26) (5.44) (4.98) 
Pupil Staff Ratio 10.83 9.81 12.29 11 
 (3.03) (2.68) (3.34) (2.92) 
Authorised Absence (% half days missed)  4.79 5.06 5.42 5.31 
 
(1.13) (1.13)   (1.08)  (1.15) 
Unauthorised Absence (% half days missed)  1.05 1.08  1.24 1.27 
 (1.04) (0.92) (1.13) (0.96) 
 
                                                 
5
  Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index shows the percentage of children in each 
SOA (Super Output Area) that live in families that are income deprived(ie, in receipt of Income 
Support, Income based Jobseeker's Allowance, Working Families' Tax Credit or Disabled 
Person's Tax Credit below a given threshold), DCSF) 
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Table 3: Probability of Treatment (Greenwich=1) 
 Coefficient s.e. 
English: Proportion attaining level 4 and above 
-0.309 (2.478) 
Maths: Proportion attaining level 4 and above 0.617 (2.419) 
Science: Proportion attaining level 4 and above 
-0.878 (2.442) 
English: Proportion with no level due to absence/disapplication 
-6.794 (12.53) 
Science: Proportion with no level due to absence/disapplication 16.91 (9.425) 
Maths: Proportion with no level due to absence/disapplication 
-21.79 (12.43) 
Percentile English score: 1st quartile 
-0.0477 (0.0411) 
Percentile Maths score: 1st quartile 
-0.0118 (0.0279) 
Percentile Science score: 1st quartile 0.0144 (0.0476) 
Percentile English score: 2nd quartile 0.0296 (0.0486) 
Percentile Maths score: 2nd quartile 0.0255 (0.0359) 
Percentile Science score: 2nd quartile 0.00924 (0.0566) 
Percentile English score: 3rd quartile 
-0.0364 (0.0397) 
Percentile Maths score: 3rd quartile 0.0656 (0.0310) 
Percentile Science score: 3rd quartile 
-0.102 (0.0585) 
% of pupils eligible for Free School Meals 1.486 (1.499) 
% of pupils female 5.033 (3.767) 
Average idaci score 
-1.014 (1.785) 
% of pupils with English as a first language 
-0.515 (0.884) 
% of pupils non-white 
-5.361 (0.986) 
% of pupils with Special Educational Needs, no statement 1.435 (1.785) 
% of pupils with Special Educational Needs, with statement 7.605 (7.583) 
Faith School 0.607 (0.333) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 
-0.0467 (0.0349) 
Pupils Staff Ratio 0.243 (0.0682) 
Authorised Absence 0.280 (0.122) 
Unauthorised Absence 0.247 (0.137) 
Observations 354  
Notes: Probit model; Coefficients and Standard errors reported, weighted by number of pupils in each 
school. All explanatory variables are 2003/2004 school level variables 
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Table 4 : Effect on educational outcomes – English Key Stage 2 results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
% Level 3 and above      
Greenwich*Post 2005 2.749 2.042 -0.327 0.350 0.479 
 (3.385) (1.905) (1.682) (1.659) (2.024) 
     
 
% Level 4 and above     
 
Greenwich*Post 2005 5.974 5.895** 3.805 4.533* 5.535* 
 (3.670) (2.574) (2.517) (2.541) (3.236) 
     
 
% Level 5 and above     
 
Greenwich*Post 2005 4.132 3.804 3.431 2.717 3.326 
 (3.305) (3.289) (3.207) (3.288) (4.422) 
 
     
 
     
Observations 1994 1991 1994 1991 1188 
Number of Schools 
  416 415 239 
School Controls No Yes No  Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Matching No No No No Yes 
      
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls 
include: % with free school meal eligibility; % girls; % require special needs, with and with-out 
statement, % of different ethnicities , % English as a first language, average Income Deprivation 
Affecting Children Index (idaci), faith school indicator. All regressions contain specific LEA trends 












Table 5: Effect on educational outcomes – Maths Key Stage 2 results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
% Level 3 and above 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 2.369 1.756 -0.710 0.325 0.303 
 (3.348) (1.806) (1.767) (1.725) (2.033) 
      
% Level 4 and above      
Greenwich*Post 2005 4.278 4.028 2.467 2.467 3.227 
 (3.764) (2.986) (2.905) (2.926) (3.480) 
     
 
% Level 5 and above 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 2.924 3.173 2.281 2.196 2.905 
 (2.931) (2.908) (2.775) (2.826) (3.258) 
 
     
 
     
Observations 1994 1991 1994 1991 1188 
Number of Schools 
  416 415 239 
School Controls No Yes No  Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Matching No No No No Yes 
      














Table 6: Effect on educational outcomes – Science Key Stage 2 results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
% Level 3 and above 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 1.997 1.389 -1.100 -0.197 -0.222 
 (3.289) (1.686) (1.606) (1.580) (1.887) 
     
 
% Level 4 and above 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 4.769 4.360 2.435 3.000 4.564 
 (3.973) (2.959) (2.841) (2.852) (3.549) 
     
 
% Level 5 and above 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 7.578** 7.534** 6.737* 6.067* 3.143 
 (3.779) (3.791) (3.605) (3.666) (4.212) 
      
Observations 1994 1991 1994 1991 1188 
Number of Schools 
  416 415 239 
School Controls No Yes No  Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Matching No No No No Yes 
      















Table 7 : Effect on educational outcomes – Pupil Level Data 
 
 All pupils Free school meals pupils  
Percentile Score (1) (2) (3) (4)  
      
English   
  
 
Greenwich*Post 2005 4.667** 2.844 1.080 -4.028  
 (2.301) (2.767) (3.209) (3.873)  
Observations 62771 50091 25379 19838  
Number of Schools 402 310 402 310  
      
Maths      
Greenwich*Post 2005 1.713 2.038 -1.689 -3.931  
 (2.249) (2.847) (3.088) (3.863)  
Observations 63804 50889 25968 20271  
Number of Schools 403 310 402 310  
      
Science      
Greenwich*Post 2005 3.917 2.353 0.489 -2.418  
 (2.635) (3.158) (3.317) (3.873)  
Observations 64587 51512 26430 20649  
Number of Schools 404 310 404 310  
      
Individual & School 
Controls  
Yes Yes Yes Yes  
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Matching No Yes No Yes  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual 
controls include: free school meal eligibility, gender, some special needs requirement, special needs 
statement, ethnicity, English as a first language, Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index score 
(idaci), month of birth dummies. School controls include: % with free school meal eligibility; % girls; 
% require special needs, with and with-out statement, % of different ethnicities , % English as a first 
language, average Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (idaci), faith school indicator. All 
regressions contain specific LEA trends and year dummies. Control LEAs include: Southwark, 






Table 8: Effect on educational outcomes –Key Stage 2 results  
School-level data 
 English Math Science 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% Level 3 and above 
    
  
Greenwich*Post 2005 0.277 0.0219 0.300 0.262 -0.205 -0.0262 
 (1.686) (1.925) (1.752) (2.059) (1.607) (1.824) 
TV*Post 2005 0.733 0.564 0.250 0.371 0.0810 0.586 
 (1.806) (1.519) (1.826) (1.862) (1.420) (1.392) 
 
      
% Level 4 and above 
      
Greenwich*Post 2005 4.636* 3.440 3.109 1.804 3.085 1.513 
 (2.603) (2.973) (3.014) (3.694) (2.939) (3.444) 
TV*Post 2005 
-1.038 -2.438 -6.440* -7.036* -0.843 1.031 
 (3.093) (3.295) (3.854) (4.050) (2.606) (2.999) 
% Level 5 and above 
      
Greenwich*Post 2005 2.651 1.279 3.293 4.324 6.615* 2.581 
 (3.331) (4.125) (2.845) (3.293) (3.864) (4.383) 
TV*Post 2005 0.659 -1.665 -11.00*** -17.41*** -5.502 -5.649 
 (2.135) (2.605) (3.841) (3.165) (5.772) (7.226) 
   
    
Observations 1991 1594 1991 1594 1991 1594 
Number of Schools 415 321 415 321 415 321 
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matching No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       










Table 9: Effect on educational outcomes – Differences across gender, race 
and special educational need 
 English Maths Science 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender 




3.416 1.617 0.338 0.00622 2.244 0.448 
 (2.909) (3.612) (2.628) (3.338) (3.116) (3.834) 
Greenwich*Post 
2005*Girls 
5.733** 3.643 2.981 3.986 5.520* 4.090 
 (2.415) (2.819) (2.568) (3.164) (2.878) (3.331) 
P Value of test of no 
difference 
0.1621 0.1630 0.6835 0.8026 0.2501 0.5596 
 
      
Race 
      
Greenwich*Post 
2005*white 
3.729 3.832 3.871 5.348* 6.270** 4.903 
 (2.603) (3.301) (2.560) (3.181) (2.660) (3.183) 
Greenwich*Post 
2005*non-white 
5.663* 2.386 -0.631 -0.691 2.093 1.045 
 (2.906) (3.130) (3.043) (3.455) (3.776) (4.299) 
P Value of test of no 
difference 
0.1169 0.0411 0.3535 0.5895 0.3497 0.2240 
 
      
Special educational 
need 
      
Greenwich*Post 
2005*no statement 
4.837** 2.907 1.897 2.124 3.732 2.033 
 (2.319) (2.796) (2.275) (2.884) (2.665) (3.215) 
Greenwich*Post 
2005*statement 
-7.419 4.155 -5.722 6.451 12.17 21.06** 
 (10.58) (12.08) (9.257) (10.35) (8.758) (9.225) 
P Value of test of no 
difference 
0.5277 0.6081 0.5910 0.7163 0.6659 0.8537 
       
Individual & School 
Controls  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 10: Effect on educational outcomes – Free School Meal Take up Rates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
% FSM Take up rate 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 0.470 0.614 -0.210 -0.379 0.129 
 (1.553) (1.331) (1.249) (1.146) (1.251) 
Observations 2034 2033 2034 2033 1456 
Schools 
  421 421 292 
 
     
% FSM Eligibility 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 
-1.100 0.182 -1.305 -0.217 -1.068*** 
 (1.537) (0.460) (1.328) (0.436) (0.381) 
Observations 2040 2039 2040 2039 1456 
Schools 
  421 421 292 
 
     
School Controls No Yes No  Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Matching No No No No Yes 
      









Table 11: Effect on Absenteeism 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Authorised 
Absenteeism 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 
-0.821*** -0.867*** -0.852*** -0.782*** -0.409 
 (0.260) (0.275) (0.260) (0.273) (0.339) 
Observations 1859 1853 1859 1853 1184 
Schools 
  381 380 239 
 
     
Unauthorised 
Absenteeism 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 
-0.299 -0.434* -0.299 -0.404 -0.0485 
 (0.256) (0.250) (0.250) (0.261) (0.289) 
Observations 1783 1777 1783 1777 1157 
Schools 
  380 379 239 
 
     
Total Absenteeism 
     
Greenwich*Post 2005 
-1.101*** -1.254*** -1.149*** -1.201*** -0.484 
 (0.347) (0.357) (0.341) (0.365) (0.399) 
Observations 1783 1777 1783 1777 1157 
Schools 
  380 379 239 
School Controls No Yes No  Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Matching No No No No Yes 





Table 12 – Effect on Educational Outcomes controlling for absenteeism 
 English Maths Science 





















       
 
      
% Level 3 and above 0.350 0.369 0.325 0.432 -0.197 -0.174 










   
% Level 4 and above 4.533* 4.597* 2.467 3.247 3.000 4.135 
Greenwich*Post 2005 (2.541) (2.706) (2.926) (2.953) (2.852) (2.964) 
  
 
   
 
   
    
% Level 5 and above 2.717 2.722 2.196 2.715 6.067* 6.881* 
Greenwich*Post 2005 (3.288) (3.566) (2.826) (3.062) (3.666) (3.950) 
 




      
Observations 1991 1848 1991 1848 1991 1848 
Number of Schools 415 380 415 380 415 380 
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matching No No No No No No 
       
 
